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Abstract
This paper presents a model which takes into account two main factors
that have been partially neglected by the economic development liter-
ature: the environmental externalities of human activities and agents’
heterogeneity in terms of asset endowment and, consequently, in terms of
income source and vulnerability to depletion of natural resources. This
approach permits to shed light on agents’ differences in feed-back mecha-
nisms and interactions between their choices and environmental dynamics
and allow us to propose a taxonomy of structural changes on the basis
of distributive, environmental and economic impact. In such context, we
identify under which conditions each structural change can occur. In par-
ticular, we identify new requirements for prompting positive structural
changes, i.e. a movement of labour to capitalistic activities associated
with poverty reduction and the alleviation of environmental pressures.
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1 Introduction
In the history of development theory, structural change, namely a movement of
labor force from the traditional resource-based sector to the modern one, has
been regarded by some economists as a cause and consequence of economic de-
velopment and growth (see e.g. Lewis 1955, Ranis and Fei 1961, Lucas 2004):
growth of the non-resource sectors may permit an unending process of labor
productivity growth because they rely on assets (human capital and physical
capital) that can expand over time. Lucas (2004) recently stated that ‘the ori-
gins of modern economic world can be seen, in part, as a transition from a
traditional agricultural society to a society of sustained growth in opportunities
of human and physical capital accumulation’. Saving and investment in phys-
ical capital can produce an increase in labor productivity leading to economic
expansion. In a dual framework, such vision implies that capital intensive ac-
tivities are able to sustain a process of economic growth, while the production
of the subsistence sector is constrained and cannot overcome a certain thresh-
old because it relies on limited factors of production. Therefore a labor shift
towards the “modern” sector leads to a structural change associated with an
increase of social welfare. Actually, many middle-low income countries have ex-
perienced a structural change associated with growing problems of environmen-
tal degradation in addition to low performances in the struggle against poverty.
Lo´pez (2003, 2007) refers to these cases as “perverse structural changes” and
he notes1 that environmental pressures can have a role in triggering off these
types of processes: pressures on natural resources can cause a decline in pro-
ductivity of agricultural traditional activities and the consequent reduction of
labor opportunity cost fuels a labor migration from agricultural sector. The
result is a movement of labor force from the traditional resource-based sector to
the modern one associated with declining or stagnant wages and with a welfare
loss for labor force2. Two direct factors that Lo´pez identifies as responsible
for the emergence of perverse structural changes are natural resource degrada-
tion and processes of disenfranchisement of part of the rural poor from access
to natural resources. In turn, these factors can be caused by demographic ex-
pansion, environmental externalities of economic production, expulsion of rural
1In particular, he refers to Latin America, but the observation is valid for many other
countries too.
2Lo´pez points out that indirect factors capable to trigger a perverse structural change are
inadequate policies aiming at fostering productivity in the modern sector in addition to a
complete neglect of traditional subsistence sector of the rural poor.
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communities due to an expansion in commodities or manufacturing activities,
large investments in hydroelectric and irrigation projects, other infrastructures
or other types of enclosures of natural common goods.
In this paper, we analyze a model which follows Lo´pez’s approach in that
we try to embody the role of environmental externalities in shaping a process of
structural change by focusing on the channel of labor costs and labor productiv-
ity, but we will attempt to also adopt a distributive perspective and to abandon
a classification between clean and a dirty sectors on the basis of their production
function. In particular, we consider a small open economy with two sectors: a
traditional resource-based sector that relies on self-employment of poor house-
holds and a sector managed by the rich. We contemplate the possibility that
both sectors cause an environmental impact. In this way, our model follows
a sectorial classification based on asset endowment of the two groups (that is
reflected in the production function) and no assumptions on relative difference
between the two sectors in the degree of environmental impact are made. On
the contrary alternative scenarios will be analyzed. The purpose is to present a
theoretical model aiming at contributing to the analysis of the role that the free
access natural resources may play in the relationship between growth, poverty
and distribution in contexts (as in several developing countries) characterized
by asset concentration, presence of relevant environmental externalities and sig-
nificant dependence of economic activities on natural capital. Understanding of
the conditions and factors related to the environmental dynamics that influence
distributional, poverty and economic outcomes may give us a clue about how
to maximize benefits from the environment or, conversely, minimize its limits
in the struggle against poverty. The remainder of the article is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses the main assumptions of the model and section 3
presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the model and investigate some
possible dynamics that may emerge, their implications in terms of well-being
and the conditions for their existence. Sections 6 and 7 draw conclusions.
2 Main assumptions of the model
2.1 Free access environmental resource and negative ex-
ternalities
In the proposed model, natural resources are represented by a free access renew-
able resource. Actually different property right regimes (open, private, public,
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and common property) usually coexist, but the impossibility to introduce such
a complex setting into a theoretical model compels making a choice and the as-
sumption of stable institutions is made: property right regime does not change
along the process of structural change. Given that many developing countries
are affected by ill-defined property rights (and it is particularly valid for the re-
source endowments of the poor), open access is analyzed as an extreme case of
this type of institutional failure3. A comprehensive review of the empirical and
theoretical literature on the effects of different property right regimes in terms
of distribution and sustainability is beyond the scope of this article. However
some observations might be worth underlining. Firstly, different property rights
regimes have been supposed to produce different environmental impacts, but
empirical evidences show a high heterogeneity of outcomes4. Given our focus
on environmental dynamics, we have preferred distinguished various scenar-
ios in terms of environmental impact instead of property regime avoiding any
schematic parallelism between the two factors. Secondly, although with some
caveats, depletion of open access renewable natural resources might represent or
embody several types of forces that can prompt a structural change. The role
of natural resources in determining a structural change can be given by changes
in quantity of natural capital or by changes in its distribution. Our model does
not manage to encompass competition on resources, but it can be noted that
distributional and environmental dynamics are often associated. In many cases
a change in distribution of fixed resources, such as land endowments, can be
partially represented by a change in a renewable natural resource, such as land
quality: for example expulsion of poor rural population from their lands because
of a “beef boom” often translates in migration toward fragile lands, so even if
they can cultivate the same amount of land, soil quality is likely to decline.
On the other hand, rich cattle owners benefit from a higher land endowment
that can be represented by an increase in their total factor productivity. Thus,
in this case the dynamics can be represented by an expansion of a capitalistic
sector that causes environmental externalities on rural poor dwellers. To the
3For certain types of resources, our model can indirectly embody the transition from open
to regulating access. For example, the regulation of fishery rights can be intepretated in
our model as a reduction in parameters representing the degree of environmental impact
produced by economic activities. However, for other environmental resource (forest, land,
etc), this interpretation is not possible because different property rights can influence not
only the intensity of resource extraction but also incentives to invest in natural capital.
4For example, the relationship between privatization of common property resources (or
the formalization of individual titles) and investment in land has been challenged by many
authors (Atwood 1990, Carter and Olinto 2003, de Janvry et al. 2001, Fitzpatrick 2005, Plaze
and Hazell 1993, Sjaastad and Bromley 1997 and 2000).
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extent that agricultural frontier can be enlarged and property rights are not well
defined land is not properly a fixed resource. Also people displacements often
lead not only to distributional changes but also degradation of natural resources.
Large investments in mining, logging, hydroelectric projects, irrigation projects
have been responsible of severe contaminations or environmental externalities
harming also communities that have not been dislocated, while displaced people
are often responsible of non-sustainable behaviors and practices because they
settle in new and unfamiliar areas, without knowing how long they will stay
and because community relations and social capital tend to deteriorate. In the
light of these observations, the choice of focusing on renewable resources in a
context of open access can be considered reasonable. The fact remains that
the introduction of alternative property regimes and different types of natural
resources might be an interesting extension for further research.
2.2 The small open economy assumption
We consider a small open economy where economic growth is supply-driven and
output prices do not depend on domestic factors but they are exogenously set.
The rationale for this choice is that in the last two decades, several countries
have undertaken trade liberalization reforms and, consequently, the importance
of the domestic demand in sustaining economic growth has diminished (at least
for trade sectors) because economies are less constrained by a limited national
demand. At the same time, the role of agricultural sector for poverty alleviation
and economic growth is less likely to operate through the channel of food prices
because this sector cannot be seen as the only supplier of food and food prices
are mainly determined by global market conditions rather than by domestic fac-
tors. These observations particularly hold for developing countries where a large
share of the farming sector comprises subsistence activities that usually rely on
household work and poor farming techniques, use their production mainly for
self-consumption and have weak backward and forward linkages with the rest
of the economy (input provider sectors, food processing and service sectors).
On the contrary in open economies, a fundamental role for economic growth
is played by productive competitiveness that depends, among other important
factors, on labor cost that is endogenously set in our model. In this sense, we
follow Matsuyama’s model (1992) that shows how the growth process might be
driven by different factors in a open and a closed context: he finds a negative
relationship between agricultural productivity and economic growth in open
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economies, while he detects the inverse links in closed economies. The key to
explaining this pattern is the different competition dynamics between agricul-
tural and industrial sector for labor: in closed economies a decrease in agri-
cultural productivity tends to hinder labor shift to manufacturing and growth
of this sector because the relative prices are determined internally. In contrast,
open economies with low agricultural productivity can import agricultural goods
whose relative price is set in the world market while at the same time benefiting
from their comparative advantage in industrial production. As a result, the
industrial sector attracts cheap labor force and it grows faster than in other
economies.
In conclusion, the model we propose assumes endogenous wages but it con-
siders relative output prices as exogenous and it neglects sectorial interactions
in terms of food (as wage good) price channel and backward/forward linkages.
Even if the introduction of these mechanisms and links might represent an in-
teresting extension of the model, our purpose here is to focus on the dynamics
which are likely to be more relevant in today developing countries and that have
been partially overlooked by economic development theory, such as environmen-
tal externalities and their role in compressing the wage rate.
2.3 Heterogeneous economic agents
In many developing countries asset distribution is highly concentrated and credit
markets are segmented. Because of credit market imperfections, differences in
asset endowment and composition determine differences in terms of constraints
and opportunities in the choices of income generating strategies. Thus, pop-
ulation composition by employment status, production functions and sectorial
structure of the economic systems partially reflect asset and income distribu-
tion. The poor satisfy their needs principally through their labor, very limited
private capital assets and public or semi free access goods such as environmen-
tal resources. In many cases wage labor or traditional primary activities are
their main source of subsistence. According to the World Resources Report
2008 (WRI, 2008), for example, despite urbanization progresses, three-quarters
of the world’s poorest families live in rural areas and they still depend in large
measure on natural resources for their existence. On the other hand, the better-
off are more able to accumulate financial, physical and human capital, they are
more likely to be employer and to rely on non-farming activities even if the
dependence of their activities on environmental resources varies a lot across
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countries and it is generally higher in economies with abundance of natural
resources5.
At the same time, vulnerability to environmental degradation is linked to
the degree of dependency on natural resources and on ability to adopt defensive
strategies, namely the ability to substitute environmental resources with other
productive assets. That is, in societies where there is a polarization in the
asset distribution, agents differ not only for their income, but also for their
vulnerability to environmental depletion. As a result, the poor, especially in
rural areas, tend to be more vulnerable to ecosystem degradation than the rich.
In the light of these elements, in the model we consider two agent typologies,
the poor and the rich, different production functions and income sources for the
two groups considered and, as we shall, this differentiation will also lead to
a divide in terms of feed-back mechanisms and interactions between agents’
choices and environmental dynamics.
Finally, in our model agents’ heterogeneity is also related to the degree
of environmental impact produced by their activities, even if a dirty sector is
not a priori defined. In fact, though it is recognized that poor families might
lack incentives or means to adopt sustainable resource management practices,
theoretical literature and empirical findings show that the vision of the poverty
as a major cause of environmental degradation is too simplistic (Chopra and
Gulati 2001, DFID et al. 2002, Durahiappah 1998, Ekbom and Bojo 1999,
Forsyth et al. 1998, Scheer 2000, Swinton et al. 2003), while the empirical
research has not reached conclusive findings about the environmental impact of
an increase in household income (World Bank 2008, Vedeld et al. 2004)6. At
the same time, many examples of unsustainable use of natural resources caused
by wealthy interests can be cited (Barraclough and Ghimire 2000, Chomitz
2008, Ghai and Vivian 1992, Heath and Binswanger 1996, Martines-Alier 2002,
Stonich 1989). For these reasons, in the model both types of agents cause
environmental externalities and no assumptions on the degree of such impact
and of resource dependence are made, but these factors are taken as exogenous
and alternative scenarios are contemplated and compared.
5On involvement of the relatively wealthies households in resource-based activities in de-
veloping countries see Barbier, 2006.
6An extensive review of the debate on poverty-environment linkages is provided by Op-
schoor (2007).
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3 The model
We consider a small open economy with three factors of production: labor, a
free access renewable natural resource (E) and physical capital (K). In this
economy, agents belong to two different populations: the “Rich” (R-agents)
and the “Poor” (P-agents). The R-agents accumulate physical capital, hire la-
bor force and employ all their potential work - represented by a fixed amount
of entrepreneurial activity - to produce a storable private good. We call their
production “capitalistic sector” or “modern sector”. The P-agents are endowed
only with labor and they have to choose the distribution of their labor between
two activities: working as employee for the Rich in the capitalistic sector or
directly exploiting natural resources to produce a non storable good. Let “sub-
sistence sector” or “traditional sector” denote production of the Poor. Given
that the Poor cannot invest and accumulate physical capital, we assume that
the capital market is completely segmented and is accessible only by the Rich.
3.1 The maximization problem of the Poor and the pro-
duction in the traditional sector
The population of the Poor is constituted by a continuum of identical individuals
and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter N . The
P-population’s welfare depends on two goods:
1) A non storable good deriving directly from free access renewable natural
resources, hereafter referred to as environmental good.
2) A good (hereafter denoted private good) which can be consumed as a
substitute for the services coming from the environmental good.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function of each P-agent is the
following
Up(cP , cS) = ln(cP + acS) (1)
where:
cS : is the consumption of the produced good as a substitute for the envi-
ronmental good;
cP : is the consumption deriving from the exploitation of the environmental
resource.
According to (1), cS and cP are perfect substitutes, with a (constant) rate
of substitution equal to a > 0. That is, the private good produced by the Rich
is able to substitute completely cP . This is a stylized fact, but it can represent
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the main components of poor people’s welfare: if they work in the subsistence
sector in rural areas (fishing, forestry, agriculture or breeding) their standard of
living strictly depends on access to and exploitation of E; while if they move to
urban zones or they become wage labor force, they satisfy their needs mainly
through the consumption of private goods.
Each P-agent, in each instant of time, employs all her potential labor (that
we normalize to unity) in the subsistence sector or in the sector of the Rich.
Thus, she cannot rely on alternative income sources at the same time. However,
in the absence of inter-sectorial moving costs, significant divergences from the
case with employment diversification are not a priori expected. Therefore, for
the sake of analytical simplicity, the hypothesis of indivisible labor allocation
will be kept.
Let us indicate with NP and NR the number of the Poor that work, respec-
tively, in the subsistence sector and in the capitalist sector. Consequently, we
have NP + NR = N . The aggregate function of production in the traditional
sector is given by
YP = αNPE (2)
This specification was proposed by Schaeffer (1957) for fishery and since then
it has been widely adopted in literature in modelling natural resources (Munro
and Scott 1993, Conrad 1995, Brander and Taylor 1998a and 1998b, McAusland
2005, Lo´pez et al. 2007). We have assumed that the Poor cannot save and that
production is completely exhausted by their consumption. From equation (2),
it follows that per capita output and consumption for the Poor working in this
sector is equal to7
cP =
YP
NP
= αE (3)
The Poor that are hired in the sector of market goods receive a real wage equals
to w (in terms of the private good produced by the Rich) that is considered
as exogenously given. By (3), the Poor are indifferent between the work in the
traditional sector and that in the capitalistic one if and only if
cP = acS = aw (4)
7In the traditional sector the labor payment is not based on marginal product activity, but
on income sharing. Thus people that work in this sector receive the average product (Ray,
1998).
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which can be re-expressed as
1
a
αE = w (5)
If
1
a
αE > w (respectively,
1
a
αE < w), then no Poor (respectively all Poor, i.e.
N) would like to work in the capitalistic sector. We assume that E is taken as
exogenously given by the Poor, that is they do not internalize the impact of their
production on natural resources; however, we will return to this issue later. In
equation (5), the parameter a determines the difference between the wage in the
capitalistic sector and the average output in the traditional sector that allow for
the same level of utility. The alignment of labor income between the two sectors
(from condition (5)) is consistent with the role of traditional sector as indicator
of the labor opportunity cost8 in other sectors. In the economy, labor supply
is affected by two factors: on the one hand, an increase in wage rate (due for
example to an augmentation in labor demand) represents a “pull” factor of labor
force; on the other hand, negative externalities causing environmental depletion
constitute a “push” factor of labor force.
3.2 The production in the capitalistic sector
The population of the Rich is constituted by a continuum of identical individ-
uals and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter
M . We normalize the size of the R-population by assuming M = 1. As said,
the representative R-agent employs all her fixed potential labor in the modern
sector as entrepreneurial activity. Without loss of plausibility, we assume that
the marginal product of entrepreneurial labor in the modern sector is higher
than the marginal product of labor in the subsistence sector. Therefore, the
possibility that the Rich work in the subsistence sector is excluded a priori and
the production function of the modern sector can be specified as follows
YR = βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ (6)
8Lo´pez (2003) observes that in developing countries labour remuneration in primary sector
(especially traditional primary activities that use labour intensive techniques) is likely to
represent the basic opportunity cost or floor wage for unskilled labour and, correcting for
skill differentials, of the whole economy. Lo´pez and Anriquez (2007) show that in Chile
(1987-2003 period) the main channel through which agriculture growth reduces poverty is the
labour market: expansion of agriculture production raises wages and employment of unskilled
workers among whom poverty is more predominant, while effects on poverty through food
price channel is less relevant. In a study on sectoral composition of growth and poverty in
India, Datt and Ravallion (1998) find that growth in farm productivity contributes to poverty
alleviation both directly and by inducing a rise in the wage rate as well as a reduction in food
prices (although the price effect is lower).
10
where:
γ > 0, δ ≥ 0 and γ+δ < 1 (i.e. the production function satisfies the constant
returns to scale assumption);
K: is the physical capital accumulated by the representative R-agent;
ND: is labor demand by the Rich;
β : is a positive parameter representing (exogenous) technical progress.
The function (6) is increasing in all its inputs, is concave and it satisfies
the Inada conditions in K and ND; while, as E approaches zero, its marginal
output tends to infinite only if δ > 0. If δ = 0, environmental resources do not
enter the production function of the Rich.
3.3 Asset accumulation
P and R-agents consider the effect of their choices on the environment as neg-
ligible and they do not internalize it; therefore, in their maximization problems
they take the evolution of E as given; that is, they behave without taking into
account the shadow value of the natural resource and so nobody has an incen-
tive to preserve or restore natural resources. Thus, investment in natural capital
does not affect the environmental stock and the dynamics of E can be described
by the usual logistic function modified for human intervention
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αNPE − ηY R (7)
where:
E is the carrying capacity of the environmental resource, that is the maxi-
mum stock at which E stabilizes in absence of negative impacts due to P and
R-agents’ economic activities;
²αNPE
χ is the aggregate environmental impact by the subsistence sector
and the parameter 0 < ² < 1 represents exploitation of the natural resource by
P-agents;
0 < η < 1 is a parameter measuring the environmental deterioration caused
by the aggregate production Y R of R-agents. Assuming identical Rich agents,
it follows that Y R = YR.
As there is no investment in natural capital, the R-agent invests in physical
capital accumulation all she saves after her consumption expenditures and re-
muneration of the employed labor force. Therefore the stock of physical capital
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grows according to the following equation
K˙ = βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ − wND − cR (8)
3.4 The intertemporal maximization problem of the rep-
resentative R-agent
Preferences of the Rich are assumed to be representable by an utility function
defined over the consumption of the private good. Let the R-agent’s instanta-
neous utility be
Ur(cR) = ln cR (9)
Therefore UR is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave, that is U ′R > 0 and U
′′
R < 0. The representative R-agent maximizes
her utility by choosing cR and the labor demand ND, that is she solves the
following intertemporal optimization problem
Max
cR, ND
∫ ∞
0
(ln cR)e−rtdt (10)
under the constraints (7) and (8), where r > 0 is the discount rate. The solu-
tion to the R-agent’s problem is found considering the following current value
Hamiltonian function
H = ln cR+λ(βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ−wND− cR)+θ(E(E−E)− ²αNPE−ηY R)
(11)
where λ and θ are the co-state variables associated to K and E, respectively.
It is easy to verify that the dynamics of λ, K and E do not depend on θ. In
fact, we have assumed that agents consider ²αNPE and Y R as given in the
maximization problem above and consequently the resulting dynamics are not
optimal; however, the trajectories under such dynamics are Nash equilibriums
(see Wirl 1997), in the sense that no (Rich or Poor) agent has an incentive to
modify her choices along each trajectory generated by the model as long as the
others do not modify theirs. The dynamics generated by the model are found
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by applying the maximum principle
K˙ =
∂H
∂λ
= βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ − wND − cR (12)
·
E =
∂H
∂θ
= E(E − E)− ²αNPE − ηY R (13)
·
λ = rλ− ∂H
∂K
= λ
[
r − βγKγ−1Eδ(ND)1−γ−δ] (14)
where cR, ND and NP are determined by the following conditions
∂H
∂cR
=
1
cR
− λ = 0 (i.e. cR = 1
λ
) (15)
∂H
∂ND
= λ(β(1−γ−δ)KγEδ(ND)−γ−δ−w) = 0 (i.e. β(1−γ−δ)KγEδ(ND)−γ−δ = w)
(16)
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wage is flexible. The equilib-
rium value of NP is given by the following labor market equilibrium condition
(obtained by equalizing left sides of (4) and (16))
α
a
E = β(1− γ − δ)KγEδ(N −NP )−γ−δ (17)
In particular, we obtain
NP = N −
[
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
] 1
γ + δ
E
−
1− δ
γ + δ K
γ
γ + δ (18)
if the right side of (18) is not negative, otherwise NP = 0 (i.e. N Poor work
in the capitalistic sector). By substituting NP = 0 in (18) and solving it with
respect to K we get the curve which separates the region where NP > 0 from
that where NP = 0 in the plane (E,K)
K = L(E) :=
[
αN
γ+δ
aβ(1− γ − δ)
] 1
γ
E
1− δ
γ (19)
where
1− δ
γ
> 1.
Along and above the curve (19) it holds NP = 0. By substituting ND with
the equilibrium value of N −NP in (16) the equilibrium wage w is found and it
can be used in (12).
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Finally, given that (ex-post) Y R is equal to YR, the dynamics generated by
the model are the following
K˙ = β(γ + δ)KγEδ(N −NP )1−γ−δ − 1
λ
(20)
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αNPE − ηβKγEδ(N −NP )1−γ−δ (21)
·
λ = λ(r − βγKγ−1Eδ(N −NP )1−γ−δ) (22)
where NP = 0 for (E,K) above (19) while NP is given by (18) for (E,K) below
the curve (19). The following restrictions on variables and parameters hold: K,
E, λ > 0; a, α, β, γ, ², η, r, E, N > 0; δ ≥ 0, γ + δ < 1.
4 Basic mathematical results
In this section we analyze the existence ad stability of the fixed points (i.e. the
stationary states) of the dynamics of the model, obtained by imposing
·
E = 0,
K˙ = 0,
·
λ = 0 in the system (20)-(22). Note that, for λ > 0, equations
·
E = 0
and
·
λ = 0 depend only on E and K and consequently solving them we obtain
the fixed point values of E and K. The corresponding value of λ is obtained by
solving the equation K˙ = 0.
4.1 The case without specialization N > NP > 0
In the case without specialization (i.e. N > NP > 0), the condition
·
E = 0 is
satisfied along the graph of the function
K = F (E) := E
1− δ
γ
(
E − E − ²αN
M(βηM−γ−δ − ²α)
)γ + δ
γ
where M :=
(
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
) 1
γ + δ , and the condition
·
λ = 0 is satisfied along
the graph of the function
K = G(E) :=
(
βγ
r
M1−γ−δ
)γ + δ
γ
E
2δ + γ − 1
γ + δ
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Therefore, the intersections between F (E) and G(E) identify the fixed points
under the regime of no specialization. To analyze the existence and stability
results about these fixed points, we define
Ω := α
(
η
a(1− γ − δ) − ²
)
(23)
∆ :=
r
βγ
(
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
)1− γ
γ
N1 := ∆
γ
1− γ
[
δa
α[η − ²a(1− γ − δ)]
]1− γ − δ
1− γ
E1 :=
(
1 +
δ
1− γ − δ
)
[(
N1
)δ
∆γ
] 1
1− γ − δ
+ α²N
E2 :=
αηN
1− γ − δ +
(
1
N
δ
∆γ
) 1
1− γ − δ
According to the sign of the coefficient Ω (see 23), two regimes can be distin-
guished:
1. REGIME DCS (Dirty Capitalistic Sector) We denote regime DCS
(Dirty Capitalistic Sector) the scenario in which η, the rate of environ-
mental impact caused by the capitalistic sector, is relatively high (ceteris
paribus) in comparison to the environmental impact of the traditional sec-
tor, measured by ε. That is, it holds Ω > 0, where Ω > 0 if and only if
η
²
> a(1− γ − δ).
2. REGIME DTS (Dirty Traditional Sector) We denote regime DTS
(Dirty Traditional Sector) the scenario in which: Ω < 0.
Now we can state the following proposition. The proof of such proposition
requires straightforward but tedious calculations; so, due to space constraints,
we omit it.
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Proposition 1 In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), two fixed points with N >
NP > 0 at most exist. In particular, if
N < N1, E1 < E < E2
then two fixed points exist; if
N ≤ N1, E ≥ E2
then one fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
In the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), one fixed point with N > NP > 0 at most
exists. In particular, if
E ≥ E2
then the fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), if there exist two fixed points, in one of these
the curve G(E) intersects F (E) from above in the plane (E,K) (we will indicate
such point by the letter A) while in the other point (that we shall indicate by
B) the opposite holds; in A the value of E is lower than in B. If only one
fixed point is admissible, its configuration is like a point B, namely in it G(E)
intersects F (E) from below (see Figure 6 of the mathematical appendix). In
the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), in the unique fixed point the curve G(E) intersects
F (E) from above.
Proposition 1 highlights that the fixed points with N > NP > 0 exist only
when the carrying capacity Eovercomes certain thresholds (E > E1 if Ω > 0
and E > E2 if Ω < 0). These thresholds are positively correlated to the rate of
environmental impact caused by the two sectors (² and η). Thus if the economic
activities are too polluting then stationary points with N > NP > 0 don’t exist.
The Proposition 1 also implies that it can always be found a E or N so that
there exist two fixed points if Ω > 0 and one fixed point if Ω < 0, namely the
maximum number of admissible stationary points.
Let (E∗,K∗, λ∗) denotes the fixed point value of the variables. The sta-
bility properties of fixed points depend on the signs of the eigenvalues associ-
ated to the Jacobian matrix J of the dynamical system (20)-(22) evaluated in
(K∗, E∗, λ∗). We define “reachable” a fixed point that has at least two eigenval-
ues with negative real parts, i.e. with a 2 or 3-dimensional stable manifold. As a
matter of fact, under the perfect foresight assumption, if the fixed point has a 2-
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dimensional stable manifold, given the initial values K(0) and E(0) of the state
variables K and E, R-agents are able to fix the initial value λ(0) of the jumping
variable λ so that the growth trajectory starting from (E(0),K(0), λ(0)) ap-
proaches the fixed point. Therefore the fixed point can be reached by growth
trajectories. If the fixed point has a 3-dimensional stable manifold, given the
initial values K(0) and E(0) of state variables K and E, a continuum of initial
values λ(0) exists so that the growth trajectory starting from (K(0), E(0), λ(0))
approaches the fixed point.
Proposition 2 The fixed points without specialization (N > NP > 0) are char-
acterized by the following stability properties:
In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), the fixed point A is always not reachable
while the fixed point B is always reachable if γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 while, if γ +
2δ − 1 > 0, the fixed point can be reachable or repulsive; however, if E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
, it is reachable.
In the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), the unique fixed point is always reachable.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 2, it follows that if the gap between the value of the
parameter E - denoting the carrying capacity - and E∗ is not too wide (namely
if E∗ >
1
2
(E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)), the fixed point B is reachable. As we will see in
the following sections, this gap depends on demographic pressure and on the
environmental impact of the production of the Poor and of the Rich because E∗
is decreasing in ², η and N . As long as the parameters ², η and N overcome a
certain threshold, the gap is such that the fixed point cannot be reached.
4.2 The case with specialization NP = 0
In this context, the condition
·
E = 0 is satisfied along the graph of the function
K = F0(E) :=
E
1− δ
γ (E − E)
1
γ
(ηβN
1−γ−δ
)
1
γ
while the condition
·
λ = 0 is satisfied along the graph of the function
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K = G0(E) :=
(
βγ
r
N
1
γ
) 1
1− γ
E
δ
1− γ
Therefore the intersections between F0(E) and G0(E) identify the fixed points
under the regime of perfect specialization in the production of the capitalistic
sector.
To state the following proposition, we define
Γ :=
1− γ − δ
2− 2γ + δ
E0 :=
(
N
Γ
)θ

(
βγ
r
) 1
1− γ
γ
ηr
(1− Γ)

1− γ
2− 2γ − δ
N0 :=
ηr
γ
(1− Γ)
(
βγ
r
) 1
γ
(
αηΓΓ
a(1− Γ)(1− γ − δ)
)2γ + δ − 1
1− γ
By straightforward but tedious calculations, we can prove that:
Proposition 3 Two fixed points with NP = 0 at most exist. In particular, if
N < N0, E0 < E < E2
then two fixed point exist; if
E ≥ E2
then one fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
When two fixed points with specialization exist, in one of these points (the
fixed point that we will denote by A0) the graph of G0(E) intersects that of
F0(E) from above, viceversa in the other fixed point (which we will indicate by
B0) Furthermore, in A0 the value of E is lower than in B0. If only one fixed
point exists, its configuration is like a point A0 namely in this point G0(E)
intersects F0(E) from above (see Figure 7 of the mathematical appendix).
We can observe that N0 depends on r but not on N , while E2 depends on
N but not on r. Therefore Proposition 3 implies that, given E, there always
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exist N and r such that at least one fixed point exists.
Proposition 4 The fixed point A0 is always not reachable, while B0 can be
reachable; in particular, it is always the case if
E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows that the fixed point with complete specialization can be reached
only when two fixed points with specialization exist, namely demographic pres-
sure and carrying capacity do not cross a certain threshold (respectively N0 and
E2). Moreover, according to Proposition 4, E∗ has to be sufficiently high, i.e.
E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
. These are sufficient conditions so that the system
presents a reachable stationary state with disappearance of the traditional sec-
tor and a complete process of “proletarianization” with all the Poor employed
in the capitalistic production.
We can also investigate whether the existence of fixed points with NP = 0
is compatible with the existence of fixed points with NP > 0. The following
Proposition identifies sufficient conditions for the simultaneous existence of four
fixed points A, B, A0 and B0.
Proposition 5 If N1 < N < N0, max{E1, E0} < E < E2, Ω > 0 , then four
fixed points exist: A0 and B0 with NP = 0, A and B with NP > 0.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 3.
For a numerical example, see Figure 1. In a context with multiple reachable
fixed points, the choice between B and B0 depends on the initial conditions.
This is a typical example of path dependence: the initial value of E andK deter-
mine the fixed point (B or B0) that the growth trajectory will approach. These
findings are clearly shown by the numerical simulations showed in Figures 2-5.
In these Figures, the continuous (dotted) lines indicate values of E∗ and K∗
corresponding to reachable (respectively, unreachable) fixed points. Note that
for some values of η and E, the conditions set in Proposition 5 are satisfied:
four fixed points exist and the initial levels of E and K determine whether B
or B0 will be reached. Moreover, as E(η ) overcomes a minimum (maximum)
level, only B0-type fixed points with full specialization are compatible with the
dynamic system and are approached. Thus, point B0 can be generated as a
final step of an “excessive” depletion of the stock of environmental resources.
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5 Comparative statics
This section studies the role played by the variation of some significant param-
eters of the model in determining a structural change defined as a variation of
labor allocation between the two sectors of the economy. To this end, we focus
our attention on the variations of the coordinates of the reachable fixed point,
in the context N > NP > 0. In particular, we are interested to study the im-
pact on R-agent’s consumption and accumulation, P-agent’s consumption and
labor allocation between the two sectors, as well as natural capital. The follow-
ing Proposition helps to identify the most significant variables that represent
dynamics of the economy.
Proposition 6 The fixed point value of consumption c∗R of the Rich is positively
proportional to the fixed point value of physical capital K∗. More precisely, it
holds: c∗R =
(γ + δ)r
γ
K∗. The fixed point values of consumption c∗S of the Poor
working in the capitalistic sector and of consumption c∗P of the Poor working
in the traditional sector are positively proportional to the fixed point value of
natural capital E∗. More precisely, it holds: c∗S =
α
a
E∗ and c∗P = αE
∗.
This implies that the Rich are able to effectively face environmental degra-
dation through physical capital accumulation. It means that exogenous changes
leading to an increase in K∗ ensure a growing c∗R, even if E
∗ declines. This is
not the case for the Poor, whose welfare is positively proportional to E∗.
The above Proposition allows to focus on equilibrium values of NP , E∗ and
K∗. From these variables, Poor and Rich agents’ welfare can be computed.
In order to carry out some exercises of comparative statics, we study how the
functions that identify the loci where
·
E = 0 and
·
λ = 0 move in relation to
variations of parameters. The following proposition concerns the impact of a
change in the more significant parameters on NP , E∗ and K∗; the proof is
straightforward but tedious, so we omit it. Results are distinguished according
to the relatively more environmental demanding sector DCS (i.e. Ω > 0) and
DTS (i.e. Ω < 0) and according to the value of the expression γ + 2δ − 1,
introduced in Proposition 2, which can be interpreted as an indicator of modern
sector dependency on natural capital. It holds γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 if δ > 1− γ
2
,
where δ is the natural capital elasticity of the production function of the modern
sector. So a positive value of γ+2δ−1 indicates a “high” importance of natural
resources in the production process of the modern sector. We will indicate by
the symbol x ↑ (respectively, x ↓) an increase (respectively, a reduction) of x.
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Proposition 7 1) If E ↑, then N∗P ↑, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↑ when γ+2δ−1 > 0 while
N∗P ↑, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↓ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0.
2) If ² ↑ or η ↑, then N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↓ when γ+2δ− 1 > 0 while N∗P ↓,
E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0.
3) If β ↑, then:
3.1) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↓ or K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 and Ω > 0.
3.2) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 and Ω < 0.
3.3) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 and Ω > 0.
3.4) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↓ or K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 and Ω < 0.
The following sections discuss these comparative statics results.
6 Classification of structural changes
Comparative statics in the regime without specializationN > NP > 0 has shown
that a change in some parameters of the model causes an impact on the fixed
point value of NP ; that is, the economy reaches an equilibrium characterized by
a different labor allocation between the two sectors. Thus a structural change
comes out. The analysis focuses on structural changes in which labor shifts from
the traditional to the modern sector (namely with NP ↓). These transitions can
be classified in four different typologies:
1) Immiserizing structural change (ISC)NP ↓, E∗ ↓, K∗ ↑: labor moves
out from the subsistence sector, the stationary value of environmental stock
declines as well as Poor agents’ consumption, while the equilibrium phys-
ical capital and the Rich agent’s consumption grow. Thus, the structural
change is characterized by environmental degradation and increase in in-
equality. Rich is not negatively affected by environmental stress because
they partially substitute natural capital with physical capital and wage labor
employment.
2) Pro-poor Structural Change (PpSC) NP ↓, E∗ ↑, K∗ ↓: labor shift
is associated with a growth in the stationary value of natural capital and
with a decrease in physical capital. That is, structural change benefits the
Poor to detrimental of the Rich.
3) Positive Structural Change (PSC) NP ↓, E∗ ↑, K∗ ↑: in this case,
the structural change leads to a Pareto improvement. Both the Rich and
the Poor are benefited and environment is preserved.
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4) Negative Structural Change (NSC) NP ↓, E∗ ↓, K∗ ↓: in this case,
environmental degradation push labor force to the capitalistic sector but
both the Rich and the Poor are harmed by the reduction in natural capital
endowment.
Comparative statics results of our model have shown that alternative scenar-
ios can emerge. Table 1 and 2 associate to variations of parameters the corre-
sponding structural change type. The following section attempts to schematize,
Parameter Ω > 0 Typology Ω < 0 Typology
N∗p E
∗ K∗ N∗p ∆E∗ K∗
E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC
β ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↑ l PpSC / PSC
η ↑ or ² ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC
Table 1: Comparative statics if γ + 2δ − 1 < 0
Parameter Ω > 0 Typology Ω < 0 Typology
N∗p E
∗ K∗ N∗p E
∗ K∗
E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↓ ISC
β ↑ ↓ ↓ l ISC /NSC ↓ ↑ ↑ PSC
η ↑ or ² ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ NSC ↓ ↓ ↓ NSC
Table 2: Comparative statics if γ + 2δ − 1 > 0
highlight and discuss our findings.
7 Interpretation of results
Most of two-sectors models with environmental externalities (e.g. Eliasson and
Turnovsky 2004, Lo´pez et al. 2007) distinguish between a clean and non-
resource sector (it comprises activities that do not employ natural capital neither
pollute) and a dirty resource sector (i.e. activities that use natural resources
as input of production and that cause an environmental impact). Under some
assumptions on the values of parameters, our model can reflect these charac-
terizations. Given that the traditional sector tends to be more dependent on
natural resources, in our model this case occurs when η = δ = 0 (where η and δ
are respectively the environmental impact and natural capital elasticity of the
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capitalistic sector production) and consequently Ω < 0 and γ + 2δ − 1 < 0.
However, differently from Eliasson and Turnovsky’s and Lo´pez’s models, in our
context this specification is not neutral from a distributional point of view. In-
deed, it implies that the production of the Poor represents the dirty sector,
while the R-agent is involved in clean production. In this context, consistently
with other models, an increase in β leads to a positive structural change and the
economy tends to fixed point with a higher level of natural and physical capital,
so welfare of the Poor and the Rich agents increases. However, if the movement
of labor is caused by an increase in environmental pressures (for example, the
parameter ε measuring the environmental impact of the traditional sector or
the parameter E representing carrying capacity decreases), the final result is an
immiserizing structural change: the traditional sector is affected by the reduc-
tion in natural capital, while the Rich are not harmed. Indeed, the capitalistic
sector is benefited by the access to labor at low cost and this, in turn, produces
incentives for investment in physical capital. Both structural changes are posi-
tive for the representative Rich agent but the results in terms of the capitalistic
sector output are different. Note that labor productivity in the modern sector
is equal to β(1− γ − δ)Kγ(N −NP )−γ−δ. Thus, even if an increase in β or in
ε, or a reduction in E, lead to the same labor shift, in the first scenario labor
productivity grows more than in the other cases. Therefore, the immiserizing
structural change leads to an expansion of the capitalistic sector associated with
a lower labor productivity than in the positive structural change.
The economy represented by our model is characterized by a more complex
context: both sectors produce and are affected by natural resource degradation.
This context gives rise to a wider set of possible scenarios, as the following
subsections attempt to illustrate.
7.1 How much the environment matters for the Poor and
for the Rich
The basic hypothesis of this work is the non-homogenous distribution of assets.
The model analyzes a stylized case in which physical capital is completely con-
centrated in the endowments of a social class (the upper class), while all agents
have access to environmental capital. Although this is a highly stylized fact,
it reflects the ways in which different assets (natural, physical, social, human
capital) are typically distributed. Physical capital tends to have a concentrated
dispersion across the population because of financial market failures. In absence
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of perfect information and competition, the wealthier individuals and large firms
have a privileged access to capital market, because they are more endowed with
collateral and they have a higher ability to exploit scale economies. Conversely,
the services coming from environmental resources may be more dispersed and
tend to have characteristics of public goods (in our model all agents have ac-
cess to environmental capital). In this context, economic agents also differ in
feed-back mechanisms and interactions between their choices of production (con-
sumption) and environmental dynamics. The case with γ + 2δ− 1 < 0 (namely
the modern sector has a relatively low dependence on natural resources) sheds
light on the consequences determined by the initial hypothesis of physical asset
concentration and free access environmental capital. From Proposition 7 and
Table 1 it follows that in this context the model tends to be a zero-sum game.
Physical capital endowments allow the Rich to employ wage labor too and this
possibility lies at the roots of a conflict between the Rich (labor employers), and
the Poor (labor force providers). The Rich are more able to defend themselves
from environmental degradation because they can partially substitute natural
capital with physical capital or wage labor employment. Thus, the Rich are
not disadvantaged by the environmental degradation because they can rely on
substitution possibilities as a defensive strategy. On the contrary, they may
benefit from the role played by the natural capital scarcity in accelerating hu-
man resources mobilization and shift of labor supply from the traditional sector
to the modern one. Therefore they take advantage of the possibility to exploit
labor at a lower cost. This, in turn, generates incentives to physical capital
accumulation. On the other hand, the poor are harmed because they face a
reduction in productivity of their labor, namely in their major mean of sub-
sistence. In this context a reduction in environmental impact of the economic
activities (i.e. a reduction in η or ²) or an increase in carrying capacity not only
help preservation of environment (equilibrium stock of natural capital grows),
but they have a distributive impact too.
7.2 Conditions for positive structural change
The comparative statics of an increase in β pinpoints the consequences of consid-
ering environmental dynamics. According to the mainstream view, an increase
in total factor productivity of the modern sector is always seen as a positive
factor leading to growth and, at least in the long term, poverty reduction. On
the contrary, the model shows that this scenario might occur only if the modern
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sector has a relatively low environmental impact in comparison to the traditional
one (i.e. Ω < 0). In this case, a rise in β determines an increase in labor produc-
tivity in the modern sector leading to a growth in wage of workers employed by
the Rich as well as an augmentation of c∗R. At the same time, the movement of
labor caused by an increase in labor demand reduces the demographic pressures
on natural resources with positive effect on labor productivity in the subsistence
sector too. Therefore, in both cases (γ+2δ−1 < 0, γ+2δ−1 > 0) a labor shift
towards the capitalistic sector is associated to a Pareto improvement and to an
increase in natural capital (i.e. a positive structural change) only if Ω < 0.
Other variations of the parameters (for example an increase in carrying ca-
pacity or a reduction in rates of environmental impact ² or η) lead to higher
level of natural and physical capital but they are not accompanied by a process
of proletarianization. The above Proposition highlights a novel requirement for
positive structural changes: labor reallocation towards the modern sector can
lead to poverty reduction only if this sector is not too polluting, namely it pro-
duces relatively low environmental externalities in comparison to the traditional
activities. The positive structural change also represents the labor transition
associated with the highest level of labor productivity because it occurs when
there is a growth in total factor productivity as well as of all productive inputs.
Therefore the positive structural change also insures the best economic perfor-
mances of the capitalistic sector in comparison to the other typologies of SC.
Looking at policy implications, we can conclude that, in a country with high in-
come and asset concentration and where the capitalistic sector is quite polluting
or environment demanding, measures to control environmental externalities of
these activities are necessary not only for sustainability, but also for economic
growth and poverty alleviation. Therefore policies aiming to promote a positive
structural change require that government support to modern sector productiv-
ity (such as incentives, direct and indirect subsidies for capital accumulation,
financial grants, tax exemptions, public credit, favorable regulations, financing
of infrastructures and so on) does not include measures too permissive in terms
of environmental externalities9.
9Environmental externalities can be represented by resource contamination or depletion
but also, adopting a broader definition, by expulsion of other users from the access to natural
resources.
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7.3 Undesirable economic growth
Not only an increase in β might fail to trigger off positive structural change,
but it can also cause an immiserizing structural change (refer to Tables 1 and
2). In particular, we focus on the effects of an increase in β in a DCS regime.
This case clearly shows that, when we consider distributive and environmental
dynamics in a joint framework, some scenarios neglected by the literature can
emerge. The economic literature in general agrees that economic growth is
a not a sufficient condition for reducing poverty, but distributional dynamics
play a decisive role in shaping effects of economic growth on poverty rates.
A stylized fact commonly accepted is that negative rates of economic growth
tend to disproportionately hit lower income quintiles, but at the same time a
positive performance may neglect the poorest. However, in practice, economic
growth remains one of the main goals pursued by national governments and
international institutions and, though a positive trend in GDP growth does
not insure per se an increase in welfare of the Poor, it is seen as a necessary
condition. This entails that actions to stimulate economic growth are consistent
with objectives of poverty reduction that, in turn, might relieve pressures on
natural resources. In contrast, the consequences of an increase in β when Ω > 0
raise doubts about this expected virtuous relationship between economic growth,
poverty reduction and preservation of ecosystems. Indeed, in this scenario the
environmental externalities may contribute to generating an undesirable and
self-reinforcing path of expansion of the modern sector associated with a process
of impoverishment10: the capitalistic sector grows producing push forces on
the Poor due to the environmental pressures, labor moves out the subsistence
sector and the capitalistic sector further expands. This unexpected result may
be explained by the fact that positive impact of a growing β on the wage is
overcome by down pressures on w because of the environmental degradation
caused by the modern sector’s expansion. Thus, an increase in β may reduce
welfare of the Poor if it is not accompanied by counterbalancing factors such as
a rise in α (i.e. total factor productivity of the traditional sector) or a reduction
10Models that predict scenarios with undesirable economic processes are not new in liter-
ature. Actually, Antoci and Bartolini (1999, 2004), Antoci et al. (2005, 2008) and Antoci
(2008) propose models in which negative externalities may constitute an engine of economic
growth. In their models, economic growth produces negative externalities that reduce the
capacity of natural or social environment to provide free goods. Agents try to defend them-
selves from welfare losses by increasing their labor supply in order to rise their consumption
of private goods that are substitute of free access goods. This, in turn, leads to economic
growth. As result, defensive strategies generate a growth path that is Pareto dominated in
terms of well-being.
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in η (i.e. environmental impact of the capitalistic sector). The parameters α
and β can be affected by public investments. Therefore, looking at the policy
implications of these findings, it could be argued that governments should take
into account the possibility of such perverse mechanisms in their decisions about
allocation of public expenditure. If the public funds focus only on the modern
sector neglecting productivity of the subsistence sector, the result may be an
immiserizing growth, namely an output growth that worsens income distribution
11.
7.4 Consequences of a high dependence on natural re-
sources
¿From Proposition 7 and Table 2 it follows that if the modern sector is more
resource-based (i.e. γ+2δ−1 > 0) the Rich are more vulnerable to environmen-
tal degradation. In this context, a change in parameters produces an impact
with the same sign to the Rich and the Poor, namely their utility are positively
correlated. Thus, a reduction in E, due to a decrease in the carrying capacity
or to an increase in η or ², leads the economy to fixed points characterized by
lower level of welfare both for the Poor and for the Rich because natural re-
sources are relevant for their consumption levels. Therefore, in the long run,
environmental policies may be win-win strategies. In this context there is not
a trade-off between goals of poverty alleviation, economic growth and environ-
mental preservation, but they require similar interventions (such as measures
for raising carrying capacity or legislation, controls and incentives for adoption
11Claims of representatives of organisations of peasants, fisher peoples, victims of tsunami
(Via Campesina, World Forum of Fisher Peoples) can be interpreted also in the light of these
findings. In the final declaration of Regional Conference on Rebuilding Peasants’ and Fisher-
folk’s Livelihoods After the Earthquake and Tsunami Catastrophes (Medan-Indonesia, 17-19
February 2005) the following statements can be read: After the terrible destruction caused by
the quake-induced tsunami, hundreds of thousands of victims have had to flee their homes,
their fishing grounds and farmlands and shift to relief camps, leading to a great sense of despair
and despondency in having to depend on charity and others for their living. This condition
has only been worsened by the attempts of governments in some tsunami-hit countries to clear
the beaches and coastal areas in the name of tsunami-preparedness, preventing coastal com-
munities from exercising control of, and access to, traditional sources of beach-based economic
activities, while simultaneously planning to hand them over to corporate and business interests
in the tourism, industrial fisheries and aquaculture, and maritime industries....... Rehabilita-
tion and reconstruction activities in the affected coastal areas should give utmost priority to
traditional, artisanal, small-scale communities relying on beach-based fishing activities, and
not to large scale mechanized fishing vessels or industrial aquaculture farms.......We reject aid
for the affected coastal fishing communities that are not locally appropriate or designed to
suit the needs of beach-based labor-intensive fishing practised by most coastal fishing commu-
nities in the affected regions, in contrast to the harbour-based fishing prevalent in the donor
countries (www.viacampesina.org).
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of sustainable practices or technologies that reduces η or ²).
7.5 Effects of resource abundance and environmental preser-
vation
Figure 6 provides information on the relationship between resource abundance
and structural change. According to these findings, in all scenarios we have that
E ↑, ² ↓ or η ↓ lead to E∗ ↑ and NP ↑. Thus, scarcity of natural resources rep-
resents a push force of labor force towards the capitalistic sector, while natural
capital abundance (given by a high endowment of natural capital stock or a low
environmental impact of human action) tends to delay labor shift to the mod-
ern sector and physical capital accumulation while at the same time reducing
poverty. If the modern sector is seen as engine of growth, our results are consis-
tent with “resource curse hypothesis”. At the same time, unlike this literature,
in our model agents’ welfare and economic growth are not always coincident:
natural capital abundance is not a curse but a resource against processes of
impoverishment even if it can be an obstacle to economic growth. However,
though our findings recall this literature, some differences have to be consid-
ered. Studies on “resource curse” have focused on settings that are not likely
to be represented by high E. In our model, the environmental resources are
public goods that all agents have access to, while well resource endowed coun-
tries have been identified according to per capita land (Wood and Berge 1997),
primary export share (Sachs and Warner 1997) or abundance of point resources
(mining, oil and, in a certain measure, plantations)12. However the use of per
capita land as a proxy of resource wealth does not capture distributive aspects,
while point resources are more likely to be appropriated by a narrow e´lite, and
export oriented primary activities can be assimilated to what we have called
“modern” sector: they often adopt capital intensive techniques of production,
employ wage workers and are managed by the rich. In these cases environmental
resources are not public but excludible goods that are mainly enjoyed by the
rich. Therefore it can be concluded that, even if our results are not tested by
the studies on performance of resource-rich countries in terms of poverty and in-
equality, they are not in opposition to this literature. Moving to change in labor
allocation, we observe that the positive (negative) relationship between ² and η
12Mineral resources, oil, plantations which require immediate processing can be considered
examples of “point” resources because their rents and sources are not diffuse. These sectors are
typically characterized by concentrated ownership and capital intensive production processes.
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(respectively, E) and immiserizing process of “proletarianization” is consistent
with the empirical evidences in many countries. Chopra and Gulati (2001) show
that, in India’s arid and semiarid regions, environmental degradation tends to
force people to move to urban areas during time of distress, especially during
droughts, while measures reducing environmental pressures lead to a decrease
in migration flows. In Nepal, out-migration to seek wage employment is one
of the strategies adopted by farmers in the hills to cope with soil erosion and
land degradation that is due to bad land use practices and to natural factors
(World Bank, 1995). The investigations on environmental degradation and mi-
gration between the US and Mexico (Schwartz and Notini 1994) confirmed that
the inability to make living from the land due to dry conditions and processes
of soil erosion contribute to the decision of rural people to migrate. Similar
evidences are found also in Africa where climate variability, climate change and
unsustainable human activities (overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and
poor irrigation practices) lead to an increasing process of desertification that
forces people to emigrate both in other rural and urban areas (UNCCD 2005).
Finally, a cross-country analysis, conducted by Shandra et al. (2003) on a panel
of fifty-eight developing countries, finds that deforestation exerts a positive effect
on over-urbanization whereas environmental sustainability produces a negative
impact on over-urbanization. According to these results, developing countries
suffering environmental degradation would be prone to over-urbanization. If
γ + 2δ − 1 < 0, this may exacerbate the increase in income distribution in-
equality: cP declines, while the consumption level of the Rich is not negatively
affected by environmental pressures because they can rely on physical capital
accumulation and employment of wage labor.
8 Conclusions
Nowadays no development strategy can avoid considering environmental dynam-
ics, externalities of human activities under a distributive perspective. Environ-
mental problems (the depletion of marine stocks, soil erosion, land degradation,
lost of forests and biodiversity, air contamination, global warming effects and
ocean acidification) have become a major concern in the international agenda,
while the poor, not only tend to rely more than the rich on natural resources but
they also are less able to defend themselves from environmental degradation.
This article has attempted to study the linkage between open access environ-
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mental resources and labor and output composition by taking into account two
main factors that have been partially neglected by the economic development
literature: agent’s heterogeneity in terms of asset endowment and, consequently,
in terms of income source and vulnerability to depletion of natural resources.
The proposed model have shown that the introduction of these factors adds
new elements in the analysis of these link and permits to shed light on agents’
differences in feed-back mechanisms and interactions between their choices and
environmental dynamics.
We have proposed a taxonomy of structural changes on the basis of distribu-
tive, environmental and economic impact and we have attempted to identify
under which conditions each SC can occur. Firstly, the work has identified new
requirements for prompting positive structural changes, i.e. a movement of la-
bor to capitalistic activities associated with poverty reduction and alleviation of
environmental pressures. In particular, the capitalistic sector has to produce a
relatively low impact on natural resources. Secondly, we have found that the ex-
istence of counter-intuitive results cannot be excluded: an increase in total factor
productivity of the capitalistic sector (or other factors leading to the growth of
this sector) might stimulate a self-reinforcing and immiserizing growth, namely
an output growth that results in a further impoverishment of the poor and in a
worsening of income distribution. This finding suggests that proper caution is
to be adopted in designing government measures which emphasize only physical
capital accumulation or expansion of the capitalistic sector with the purpose
to fight poverty via economic growth. Indeed, some “collateral” effects may
jeopardize the benefits of economic growth causing environmental degradation
and impoverishment processes.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof Proposition 2
Recalling the definition of M and noticing that NP = N −MK
γ
γ + δ E
δ − 1
γ + δ
the dynamic system becomes
K˙ = β(γ + δ)K
γ
γ + δ E
2δ + γ − 1
γ + δ M1−γ−δ − 1
λ
(24)
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αN +K
γ
γ + δ E
δ − 1
γ + δM(²α− ηβM−γ−δ) (25)
·
λ = λ
r − βγK− δγ + δ E 2δ + γ − 1γ + δ M1−γ−δ
 (26)
Let (K∗, E∗, λ∗) denotes the fixed point values of (K,E, λ). Remember that
fixed points of our system correspond to the intersections between the graphs of
the functions K = F (E) and K = G(E) occurring below the curve K = L(E)
in the plane (E,K) (see Figure 6) It is easy to check that Figure 6 shows
all possible configurations of curves K = F (E) and K = G(E); in such figure,
E1 :=
1− δ
1 + γ
(E− ²αN) indicates the value of E maximizing F (E); furthermore,
when the curve K = L(E) is not drawn, this means that both the intersections
between K = F (E) and K = G(E) occur below K = L(E); that is, both
intersections give rise to fixed points in the regime N > NP > 0.
Before calculating the Jacobian matrix, we note that from (25) and (26) it
follows that in the fixed point it holds
1
λ
=
r(γ + δ)
γ
K∗ (27)
and
N −NP = E − E
∗ − ²αN
Ω
By straightforward calculations we now find the Jacobian matrix evaluated at
31
the steady state (J∗)
J∗ =
 h
∗
K h
∗
E h
∗
λ
f∗K f
∗
E f
∗
λ
g∗K g
∗
E g
∗
λ

where
h∗K = r
h∗E =
r(γ + 2δ − 1)K∗
γE∗
h∗λ =
1
λ2
=
(
r(γ + δ)K∗
γ
)2
f∗K = −
γ
γ + δ
E∗(N −NP )Ω
K∗
f∗E =
1 + γ
γ + δ
(E1 − E∗)
f∗λ = 0
g∗K =
γδ
(γ + δ)2(K∗)2
g∗E = −
γ
(γ + δ)2
γ + 2δ − 1
E∗K∗
g∗λ = 0
Therefore, h∗K , h
∗
λ and g
∗
K are always positive, h
∗
E and ρ := γ + 2δ − 1 have
the same sign, g∗E and ρ have opposite sign, f
∗
K and E1 − E∗ have the same
sign, f∗K and Ω have the opposite sign.
In order to study the stability properties of fixed points, we apply the
methodology proposed by Wirl (1997). The eigenvalues of the system are the
roots of the following characteristic polynomial
P (z) = z3 − z2tr(J∗) + zM2 − |J∗|
where
tr(J∗) = k∗k+f
∗
E+g
∗
λ |J∗| = h∗λ(f∗Kg∗E−f∗Eg∗K) M2 = −h∗λg∗K+h∗Kf∗E−h∗Ef∗K
Therefore, the following results can be easily proved.
Lemma 1 If E∗ < E1, then tr(J∗) > 0.
Lemma 2 If Ω > 0, then |J∗| < 0 in A and |J∗| > 0 in B.
If Ω < 0, in the unique admissible fixed point it holds |J∗| > 0.
Lemma 3 If ρ < 0, then M2 < 0.
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If ρ > 0 and Ω < 0, then M2 < 0.
If ρ > 0 and Ω > 0, a sufficient condition forM2 < 0 is E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
.
It is now possible to discuss stability properties of A andB, in the regime Ω >
0, and of the unique admissible point in the regime Ω < 0. As explained in the
main text, we define “reachable” those fixed points with at least two eigenvalues
with negative real parts, i.e. with a 2 or 3-dimensional stable manifold.
9.1.1 Stability analysis of A
In A, it holds |J∗| < 0; therefore, such fixed point may be unreachable (a
saddle point with two positive eigenvalues) or locally attractive (i.e. a sink).
Conditions for local attractivity are (Wirl, 1997): tr(J∗) < 0, |J∗| < 0 and
M2 < 0. Figure 6 shows that the fixed point A can assume two possible
configurations. In the cases (a) and (b), it holds ρ < 0; thus, from Lemma 3, it
follows that M2 < 0, therefore A cannot be attractive. This implies that A is
unreachable. In the cases (e) and (f), in A it holds E∗ < E1; this implies, by
Lemma 1, that tr(J∗) > 0. Thus A cannot be attractive and it is unreachable.
In short, the fixed point A is always not reachable.
9.1.2 Stability analysis of B and of the fixed point in the regime
Ω < 0
In B and in the fixed point in the regime Ω < 0 it holds |J∗| > 0; therefore,
such fixed points can be repulsive or reachable (Wirl 1997). Wirl finds that a
positive determinant and a negative coefficient M2 are sufficient conditions for
saddle point stability (i.e. for reachability). Given Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, this
happens when ρ < 0 (Figure 6, cases a-d) or when ρ > 0 and Ω < 0 (Figure
6, case h). If ρ > 0 and Ω > 0, the sign of M2 is not univocally determined.
Consequently, in this case, B can be repulsive or reachable. However, by Lemma
3, E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
is a sufficient condition for saddle point stability
(Figure 6, cases e-g); this completes the proof of Proposition 2.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to study the stability proprieties of fixed points in the regime NP = 0,
we calculate the Jacobian matrix J∗0 evaluated at a fixed point (K
∗, E∗, λ∗) with
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NP = 0
J∗0 =
 h
∗
0K h
∗
0E h
∗
0λ
f∗0K f
∗
0E f
∗
0λ
g∗0K g
∗
0E g
∗
0λ

Remembering that r − βγKγ−1EδN1−γ−δ = 0, we have
h∗0E =
rδ(γ + δ)K∗
γE∗
> 0
h∗0K = (γ + δ)r > 0
h∗0λ =
r2(γ + δ)2(K∗)2
γ2
> 0
f∗0E = E(1− δ)− (2− δ)E∗ > 0, if E∗ < EM :=
E(1− δ)
2− δ
f∗0K = −ηr < 0
f∗0λ = 0
g∗0E = −
γδ
(γ + δ)K∗E∗
< 0
g∗0K =
γ(1− γ)
(γ + δ)(K∗)2
> 0
g∗0λ = 0
Let us first consider tr(J∗0 ) = h
∗
0K + f
∗
0E .
Figure 7 shows all possible configurations of the fixed points with NP =
0. Remember that fixed points correspond to the intersections between the
graphs of the functions K = F0(E) and K = G0(E) occurring above the curve
K = L(E) in the plane (E,K). In such figure, EM indicates the value of E
maximizing F0(E); furthermore, when the curve K = L(E) is not drawn, this
means that both the intersections between K = F0(E) and K = G0(E) occur
above K = L(E); that is, both intersections give rise to fixed points in the
regime NP = 0.
Note that in A0 it holds E∗ < EM ; therefore f∗0E > 0 and tr(J
∗
0 ) > 0 (see
cases a-b in Figure 7).
In Figure 7a, in B0 it holds E∗ < EM ; therefore f∗0E > 0 and tr(J
∗
0 ) > 0.
In Figure 7b, in B0 it holds E∗ > EM ; therefore f∗0E < 0 and the sign of tr(J
∗
0 )
is not univocally determined.
Let us now analyze the sign of |J∗0 | = h∗0K(f∗0Kg∗0E − f∗0Eg∗0K). We can
observe that in A0 it holds F0E > G0E , while in B0 it holds F0E < G0E , where
F0E = − f0E
g0K
and G0E = − g0E
g0K
. It follows that |J∗0 | < 0 in A0 while |J∗0 | > 0
in B0. If only one fixed point exists (Figure 7c), then in such point it holds
F0E < G0E and consequently |J∗0 | > 0.
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Let us consider
M02 = −h∗0λg∗0K+h∗0Kf∗0Ef∗0K = −
r2(γ + δ)
γ(1− γ) +r(γ+δ)(E(1−δ)−(2−δ)E
∗)+
δηr2(γ + δ)K∗
γE∗
Replacing K∗ =
γ(E − E∗)
rη
, we obtain
M02 = − r
2(γ + δ)
γ(1− γ) + (E(1− δ)− (2− δ)E∗) + δ(E − E∗) > 0
if E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
.
9.2.1 Stability analysis of A0
Since in A0 it holds |J∗0 | < 0, such fixed point can be a saddle point with
two positive eigenvalues or a sink. Given that tr(J∗0 ) > 0, local attractivity is
excluded and the fixed point A0 is always not reachable.
9.2.2 Stability analysis of B0
In B0 we have |J∗0 | > 0; therefore such fixed point can be repulsive or reachable
(Wirl 1997). If E∗ >
1
2
(E− r
γ(1− γ) ) then M02 < 0 and the fixed point cannot
be repulsive. That is E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
is a sufficient condition for saddle
point stability.
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Figure 1: Four fixed points: A0 and B0 with Np = 0, A and B with Np > 0.
The parameters’ values are: α = 2, β = 1, γ = 0.4, δ = 0.1, ² = 0.1, η = 0.1,
a = 1, r = 0.1, E = 0.96, N = 1.
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Figure 2: The value of K, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying E. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 3: The value of K, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying η. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 4: The value of E, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying E. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 5: The value of E, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying η. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 6: Fixed points with Np > 0.
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